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# Antiminority Riots in Unified Germany

## Cultural Conflicts and Mischanneled Political Participation

*Roger Karapin*

Two large antforeigner riots in eastern Germany, at Hoyerswerda in September 1991 and at Rostock in August 1992, created a political sensation. They attracted far more attention, outcry, and veiled approval from political leaders than two thousand smaller assaults on foreigners that took place across unified Germany during those two years. Explanations of the riots in unified Germany and also much of the theoretical work on antiminority riots in other democratic systems have focused on three sets of causes: ethnonationalism, insecure ethnic identities, and racism; poverty, inequality, and competition between ethnic groups for scarce resources; and political elites' agitation of enmity to mobilize groups along ethnic lines.<sup>1</sup>

These analyses are flawed in two ways. First, they often treat riots as simply the most extreme manifestation of ethnic conflict and violence rather than as a qualitatively different phenomenon. Because of their nature and their political significance, antiminority riots should be analyzed separately from other forms of ethnic conflict.<sup>2</sup> Of course, violence is distinct from other forms of conflict in that it requires risky behavior, usually involves some confrontation with police, and has terrible consequences for its targets. Moreover, antiminority riots are a quite distinct form of ethnic violence. By antiminority riots, I mean sustained physical attacks on members of a subordinate ethnic minority group by large numbers of people who belong to the dominant ethnic group, are motivated by ethnic or racial animosity, and are not agents of the state.<sup>3</sup> Hence antiminority riots differ from commodity riots by minority group members against property and police (often called race riots) and from hit-and-run assaults by small groups against minority group members (racist violence).

Moreover, antiminority riots in democratic settings have unusual political significance. Such riots often attract large numbers of approving adult spectators who are not evidently members of extreme nationalist or racist organizations. Hence politicians and news media may interpret the riots as indicators of widespread and salient ethnic antagonisms. Therefore, political reactions to antiminority riots can lead to major policy shifts, such as immigration restrictions and limitations on minority rights. Furthermore, because of the scale of the mobilization other perpetrators may try to imitate the attacks. At Hoyerswerda and Rostock crowds of many hundreds or several thousands of adults

gathered to watch the skinheads attack the foreigners' housing, sometimes cheering on the attackers and chanting antiforeigner slogans. The riots were heavily covered by television and other news media, and they touched off large numbers of violent attacks against foreigners across unified Germany and fueled a national political debate on the right to political asylum. Ultimately, they helped lead to a constitutional amendment sharply restricting asylum rights in May 1993.<sup>4</sup>

Second, most studies are based on analyses of riots and ignore cases where riots did not occur.<sup>5</sup> Together, these two flaws have led to an overemphasis on variables such as racism and poverty that are much more common than antiminority rioting is. Such factors do not help explain why riots rather than other forms of ethnic conflict occur. Even in countries, regions, and historical periods with ethnic riots, many localities do not experience riots, although there may be small-scale racist violence. For example, in Britain the number of racially motivated attacks against nonwhite people ranged between about 1,200 and 2,300 annually in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but Britain has not had any antiblack rioting since 1965.<sup>6</sup> In Germany skinheads and neo-Nazis carried out 1,100 arson attacks against foreigners' housing and property between 1990 and 1992, but only six major riots against foreigners occurred during these three years, all in eastern German communities.<sup>7</sup>

This article helps identify the additional conditions that tend to turn ethnic conflicts, including small-scale violence, into antiminority riots. It draws on theoretical works that specifically address antiminority riots in order to elaborate plausible hypotheses, then analyzes contrasting cases in eastern Germany soon after the unification of East and West Germany. Hoyerswerda and to a lesser extent Rostock are compared with Riesa, an eastern German locality that experienced no rioting and indeed little antiforeigner violence in the early 1990s.

If antiminority riots are analyzed as a distinct phenomenon through a cross-sectional approach, local political processes appear to be important causes of the riots, while ethnic competition and national political processes are evidently less important. In particular, cultural conflicts, the channeling of mobilization away from non-violent forms and into violent forms, the local provision of political opportunities for success, and mobilization by social movement organizations tend to convert lower-level ethnic conflict and ethnic violence into major riots. These local processes can help explain why riots are more likely in two circumstances: after ethnic groups migrate to new localities in democratic countries and while an ethnically diverse country experiences a chaotic transition to democracy.

### **Theoretical Approaches and Hypotheses**

**Racist and Xenophobic Attitudes** Although xenophobia is a popular explanation of the German riots, hostile attitudes toward minorities in fact are not closely related

to rioting. Negative (even racist) attitudes toward foreigners were very widespread in western European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, yet only Germany had antiimmigrant riots.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, eastern Germany in the early 1990s did not have generally higher levels of xenophobia than western Germany, but the riots occurred only in the east, where rates of antforeigner violence were also much higher.<sup>9</sup> Racism and xenophobia are obviously necessary conditions for antiminority riots, but the prevalence of such attitudes sufficient to produce riots seems low enough to be widespread. Because xenophobic attitudes comprise a poor explanatory factor of cross-sectional differences, and because local attitudinal data are basically nonexistent in Germany, this hypothesis will not be pursued further.

**Ethnic Competition and Economic Grievances** Ethnic competition theory has been widely applied to ethnic conflict, including antiminority riots.<sup>10</sup> The theory holds that competition for scarce resources between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups, due, for example, to increases in immigration or unemployment, leads to riots and other violence as the dominant group tries to protect or advance its material interests. This theory might account for the eastern German riots, since eastern Germany experienced massive increases in unemployment after unification and small inflows of foreigners in the early 1990s. The first hypothesis is that antiminority riots will take place in locations and at times with unusually high or rising unemployment rates and immigrant population shares, since in those areas the competition for jobs and housing is most intense.

**Cultural Conflicts** Park has argued that a minority group's differences in appearance and in culturally rooted customs initially produce an apprehensive, defensive reaction from native populations, in places where the natives have little experience in interacting with ethnic strangers.<sup>11</sup> Building on this idea, Husbands suggests that initial interactions between ethnic groups are prone to spark conflicts that arise from different customs relating, for example, to noise, sanitation, dress, sexual relations, and religious practices and that these conflicts can lead to territorial riots between ethnic groups.<sup>12</sup> Riots are especially likely when actual differences in cultural practices become exaggerated by racist or ethnonationalist stereotypes and rumors. The second hypothesis is that cultural conflicts spurred by the relatively recent arrival of new ethnic groups become acute in the period before the beginning of rioting and that large-scale violence grows out of these cultural conflicts.

The cultural conflicts theory suggests a link between immigration and rioting in eastern Germany that differs from that proposed by ethnic competition theory. In both cultural conflicts and ethnic competition members of the dominant group are offended or threatened by what they perceive as efforts by the minority group to improve its position at the expense of the dominant group.<sup>13</sup> But in cultural conflicts scarce economic resources are not at stake, and the sources of conflict might be removed through communication and experience.

**Facilitation and Channeling of Political Participation** Antiminority rioting can be interpreted as rational political activity.<sup>14</sup> Rioters may aim to drive members of the minority group out of the area, to inflict enough harm to deter others from coming, or to increase the power position of the dominant group relative to the minority within the locality. As they pursue their goals, potential participants in riots are best seen as “challengers,” since they lack routine access to authoritative decision making; they contrast with political elites such as government officials, party leaders, and interest group leaders, who enjoy such access.<sup>15</sup> As challengers, potential rioters are sensitive to political opportunity structures that in turn can be strongly influenced by political elites.<sup>16</sup> One main dimension of political opportunity structures is facilitation, that is, the lowering of the costs and risks of taking certain kinds of political actions relative to prior conditions and to other actions.<sup>17</sup> Patterns of facilitation can explain why riots, rather than merely smaller-scale violence, nonviolent protests, lobbying, or voting on behalf of the antiminority cause, occur.

Indeed, bias, inaction, and vacillation by police have been recognized as crucial factors in all kinds of riots.<sup>18</sup> But elites’ reactions to violence comprise only half of the facilitation process; the other half consists of low cost channels for nonviolent mobilization, such as voting for antiminority candidates, contacting officials, and attending neighborhood meetings.<sup>19</sup> Such channels have different effects on instigators of violence, who engage in severe and provocative violence, and on supporters, who shout and cheer, chant slogans, interfere with police, or merely serve as sympathetic or interested audience members. When nonviolent channels are available, potential supporters of violence will tend to use them; hence, even if instigators carry out violence against ethnic minorities, their attacks are unlikely to draw the crowds of supporters necessary to create riots.

The third hypothesis is that antiminority rioting is much more likely when political elites and institutions channel political participation by dominant group members in two ways: by failing to provide low cost, effective, nonviolent channels for mobilization on grievances concerning the minority group, and by reducing the costs and risks for the perpetrators of antiminority violence, especially through police actions and inaction.

**National and Subnational Political Opportunities** The other main dimension of political opportunity structures concerns opportunities, that is, the probability that action by challengers will help them achieve an outcome they desire, such as driving out the minority group.<sup>20</sup> Opportunities will appear to be greater if political elites publicly support antiminority positions, suggesting that further antiminority mobilization, including riots, might tip the balance in favor of antiminority decisions by government. For example, opportunities rise if political elites engage in public debates about immigration control policies, suggest that ethnic minorities might be

removed from a locality, give a hearing or other support to antiminority groups, or make public statements hostile to the minority group. Many authors have argued that national politicians encouraged the 1990s riots in Germany by advocating restrictions on asylum rights.<sup>21</sup> The fourth hypothesis is that antiminority riots occur only after national political elites show, through public statements or actions, that they share potential rioters' opposition to the presence of the ethnic minority.

However, subnational elites may also be important in creating antiminority opportunities.<sup>22</sup> Local government is relatively easily accessible to groups that are weakly organized and poor in material resources. Local politicians are often the first to respond to emerging issues, and they may be more willing than national politicians to make antiimmigrant or racist statements.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, in Germany as in many countries regional and local authorities have substantial power over where minority populations are housed. The fifth hypothesis is that antiminority riots occur only after subnational political elites increase apparent opportunities by signaling that they share potential rioters' opposition to the presence of the ethnic minority. Where subnational officials control the police, as in Germany, such signals may also encourage rioting by shifting the pattern of facilitation, as posited in the third hypothesis.<sup>24</sup>

**Social Movement Organizations** Although antiminority riots are sparked by a wide range of triggering events, they do not necessarily begin and develop spontaneously, without organization.<sup>25</sup> Rather, social movement organizations may trigger events or instigate broader mobilizations through events created by others; organizations help solve the free-rider problem of collective action. Social movement organizations are either formal organizations or loosely organized groups that undertake a challenge.<sup>26</sup> Even small and informally organized social movement groups can induce their members to undertake risky action by socially rewarding and sanctioning them.<sup>27</sup> Studies of skinhead groups have noted that their members attain important intangible benefits such as a sense of belonging in exchange for undertaking risky actions.<sup>28</sup>

Social movement organizations relevant to antiminority riots have two qualities. They are opposed to ethnic minorities, and they include offensive violence in their collective action repertoires. Examples of youth groups involved in antiminority riots include athletic clubs and gangs in the antiblack riots in Chicago in 1919 and Teddy boys in the antiblack riots in Britain in the 1950s. Examples of far-right organizations include right-wing groups in the anti-Jewish riots in Odessa in 1905 and the White Defence League in the Notting Hill, London riots in 1958.<sup>29</sup> The sixth hypothesis is that violent, antiminority social movement organizations are present in riot localities and that an increase in their activities contributes to antiminority riots.

**Immigration and the Rise of Antiminority Violence in Unified Germany** Just before and after unification in 1990 Germany experienced a sharp increase in both

immigration and violence against its ethnic minorities, who seldom possess German citizenship and are typically labeled foreigners.<sup>30</sup> Between 1988 and 1993 the foreign population of Germany increased by 2.4 million, including 1.4 million people from eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa who applied for political asylum and 200,000 who were living in East Germany before unification. In addition, about 1.6 million ethnic German resettlers arrived from eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and its successor states in this period, with constitutional rights to automatic German citizenship; they were immediately classified as German.<sup>31</sup> Asylum seekers were attracted by rights embedded in the German constitution and courts that allowed them to remain in the country for many years while their cases were decided.<sup>32</sup> Skinheads, other youths, and neo-Nazis carried out an average of 400 arson attacks and 1,300 other violent crimes against foreigners per year from 1991 to 1993, about a tenfold increase from the 1980s; attacks dropped sharply after 1993, as did immigration.<sup>33</sup> The main targets of attacks were asylum seekers, who were distributed to the eastern states beginning in 1991. In the east victims of antiminority violence after unification also included foreign laborers from Africa and Vietnam who had been recruited by the East German government and were to remain in the eastern part of unified Germany until their multiyear labor contracts expired. By far the most important attacks were the riots at Hoyerswerda and Rostock. Their duration, intensity, and number of participants made them the most serious antiminority attacks in postwar Germany and were reflected in their political significance.<sup>34</sup>

Hoyerswerda and Riesa counties lie within the eastern state of Saxony, which had the third highest per capita rate of antiforeigner violence among all German states in 1991.<sup>35</sup> Yet over half of Saxony's fifty-four counties and independent cities had no publicly reported attacks against the dwellings of foreign workers and asylum seekers during the peak periods of violence in the state.<sup>36</sup> Among the low violence counties, Riesa is comparable with Hoyerswerda on many key dimensions. Both had a medium degree of urbanization, similar unemployment rates, a medium number of foreign residents, a relatively large group of asylum seekers, a relatively large group of right-wing skinheads, similar levels of skinhead action, and local government effectively dominated by a grand coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD).<sup>37</sup>

In combining low violence with these structural features, Riesa is representative of many other localities in eastern Germany. Within Saxony there was little antiforeigner violence during the period studied in ten out of the nineteen localities (53 percent) that had large skinhead groups, in sixteen out of the twenty-nine localities (55 percent) that had stable or increasing shares of foreigners, and in thirteen out of the twenty-two localities (59 percent) that housed at least fifty asylum seekers by the end of 1993.<sup>38</sup> By controlling for minority populations, unemployment, and skinhead organization, the Hoyerswerda-Riesa comparison focuses on the potential

effects of cultural conflicts, the channeling of participation, the facilitation of violence, and local political opportunities. The hypotheses regarding ethnic competition and national opportunities will be tested by examining evidence internal to each case, by comparing riot cases to the rest of eastern Germany, and by analyzing temporal developments.

### **Riots in Hoyerswerda versus Peaceful Ethnic Relations in Riesa**

**Foreigners and Antiforeigner Violence in Hoyerswerda and Riesa** Hoyerswerda and Riesa were similar in many respects. Foreign laborers, mainly from Mozambique and Vietnam, had lived in Hoyerswerda county since the early 1980s; they worked mainly in the locally dominant coal industry, on three-year labor contracts. In addition, about 230 asylum seekers from over twenty countries, principally Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and Ghana, were moved into the city of Hoyerswerda by Saxon and local authorities in spring 1991.<sup>39</sup> Riesa in 1991 was an industrial county dependent on a few large employers in the steel industry. In Riesa, too, the East German government had brought hundreds of foreign workers from Mozambique, Vietnam, and Angola. During 1991 260 asylum seekers from at least twelve countries arrived in Riesa county, as did 200 ethnic German resettlers.<sup>40</sup>

On September 17, 1991, right-wing skinheads began sustained, large-scale attacks on foreigners in Hoyerswerda. Attacks against the foreign workers continued for four days and were followed by three days during which crowds massed outside the asylum seekers' housing, located in a different neighborhood about three kilometers distant.<sup>41</sup> The attackers used bottles, chains, clubs, baseball bats, and molotov cocktails, threatened to burn down the building, and said they would continue their attacks until the foreigners left. At the height of the rioting fifty to one hundred youths attacked the foreigners' housing, while crowds of 500 or more adults watched, shouted slogans, cheered, and hindered police. The attacks against the foreign workers continued until police massed outside their housing, and the attacks against the asylum seekers continued until authorities removed the victims from Hoyerswerda county to undisclosed locations in Saxony.

The violence was directed mainly against the foreign workers, whose housing was heavily attacked night after night, while the actions against the asylum seekers took the form of a siege and threats rather than heavy violence. Nonetheless, the Hoyerswerda riots strengthened national political forces that sought to restrict asylum rights. The national leaders of the CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU), which governed in Bonn in a coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), used the riots to pressure the opposition SPD to accept a constitutional amendment that would reduce asylum applications.<sup>42</sup> To the present day, Hoyerswerda is a widely recognized symbol of the popular rejection of asylum seekers in Germany.



Riesa had an active skinhead group of twenty to thirty-five youths, yet through the end of 1993 they did not carry out a single concerted attack against the residences of asylum seekers or other foreigners living in the county. Skinheads tried to attack Riesa's asylum hostel several times, but each attempt remained unsupported by neighbors, was aborted, and damaged little property. For example, in September 1992, in the wake of the Rostock riots and in the middle of a large wave of attacks on foreigners' hostels throughout Germany, thirty to forty youths from the residential area around the Riesa county asylum hostel assembled outside it. They were met by a large police presence. After police and youths waited for two hours, the group dissolved, and the youths went home.<sup>43</sup>

**Ethnic Competition and Violence in Eastern Germany** The hypothesis concerning ethnic competition for material resources receives little support from these cases. The antiforeigner riots in the eastern states occurred during a major economic crisis there. The introduction of West German currency caused industrial production to drop by about two-thirds during the second half of 1990; the real rate of unemployment, including those out of work and on short hours, reached about 29 percent in July 1991.<sup>44</sup> After more than forty years of a command economy with guaranteed employment, the subjective sense of economic insecurity was intense for many eastern Germans.

However, the antiminority riots did not occur in the most objectively distressed areas of eastern Germany.<sup>45</sup> Hoyerswerda county's unemployment rate was several percentage points below the average for Saxony, and youth unemployment there actually dropped by a third from July through October 1991. Rostock's unemployment rate was also below average.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, although unemployment was rising, there was actually very little job competition between the foreigners and the native population in Hoyerswerda. The foreign workers had the most dangerous and dirtiest jobs, which Germans normally were unwilling to take, for example, working around phenol in the local coal processing plant.<sup>47</sup> Asylum seekers in Germany were completely banned from employment until July 1991 and after then could receive work permits only if it could be shown that no European Community citizen could do the job. In Hoyerswerda asylum seekers were not even required to do community work in exchange for social assistance, since local officials wanted to reserve any such work opportunities for Germans.<sup>48</sup> "Foreigners take our jobs away" was nevertheless a frequent complaint of Hoyerswerda residents. Perceived grievances may be necessary for antiminority riots, but subjective perceptions of ethnic competition can also be produced in the absence of objective competition. Finally, German residents were not threatened by large numbers of ethnic minorities. Even after two years of immigration, at the end of 1992 the foreign population share in eastern Germany was only 2.8 percent, compared with 9.4 percent in the relatively low violence western part of the country. The foreign population of Hoyerswerda actually declined

during the nine months before the riots; it was 36 percent lower in the city in August than it had been at the start of 1991, because more foreign workers went home than asylum seekers arrived.<sup>49</sup> Nor were foreigners competing with Germans for apartments in Hoyerswerda, which had a housing surplus due to an overall decline in population. Indeed, both the foreign workers and the asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda were living in buildings that had been occupied for years by foreign laborers, not by Germans. In housing the potential for ethnic competition was actually greater in Riesa. There the total number of foreigners was stable during 1991, and housing was scarce, with 3,500 households seeking apartments that year.<sup>50</sup>

**Cultural Conflicts in Eastern Germany** The differences in violence between Hoyerswerda and Riesa are much more closely related to differences in cultural conflicts. In the city of Hoyerswerda the presence of small numbers of foreigners concentrated in the densely populated Neustadt section led to cultural conflicts, mainly between the foreigners and their immediate neighbors. Small-scale conflicts between Germans and the foreign workers had occurred in the 1980s, but larger conflicts were suppressed until after the East German state collapsed.<sup>51</sup> Civil liberties were effectively introduced in 1989–90, after hard-line Communist Party chairperson Erich Honecker resigned in October 1989, the police and secret police stopped enforcing Communist-era discipline, and competitive national elections were held in March 1990.

Suddenly, eastern Germans' dissatisfaction with foreigners could be expressed much more freely. In contrast, the foreigners' views about the cultural practices of their German neighbors did not become the topic of political conflicts and newspaper reporting, due to their much weaker social and political position. The main complaints by Germans in Hoyerswerda concerned late night noise, garbage, and reckless driving by foreigners; other complaints concerned sexual relations between foreign men and German girls or young women.<sup>52</sup> The foreign workers and asylum seekers were housed in groups of over one hundred, thus concentrating the behaviors that many Germans found offensive, threatening, or incomprehensible. The problems were intensified by high density housing. Some Germans lived in the same twelve story apartment complex occupied by the foreign workers, and many others lived in adjoining or immediately neighboring buildings. Conflicts over noise were exacerbated by the Germans' day work schedules, while many foreign laborers worked late shifts and the asylum seekers had much free time since they were not permitted to work at all.

The Hoyerswerda riots were closely related to these cultural clashes. In September 1991, as most foreign workers were preparing to leave for their countries of origin, noise from their farewell party, described as especially loud, bothered their German neighbors. A few days later these neighbors formed the bulk of the crowds that participated in the first nights of rioting. Moreover, when skinheads attacked

Vietnamese at the start of the September 1991 riots, Mozambicans counterattacked by throwing objects from the roof of their building. The sight of black men fighting German youths frightened or outraged some Germans and helped to draw large crowds sympathetic to the skinheads who attacked the Africans.

The cultural conflicts between asylum seekers and their neighbors in Hoyerswerda were exacerbated by public policies adopted by both the East German regime and the Federal Republic of Germany. In East Germany the state actively discouraged and prevented social interaction between foreign workers and the German population.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, conflicts between Germans and foreigners were not tempered by friendships or channeled into nonviolent forms along preexisting lines of communication. Furthermore, when asylum seekers arrived in Hoyerswerda, local officials treated them according to policies adopted by West Germany's state and federal governments during the 1980s: the ban on employment, a requirement that asylum seekers live in hostels and stay within the county to that they were assigned, and inadequate personnel to mediate between them and their German neighbors.<sup>54</sup> These policies were intended to deter asylum seekers from coming to Germany, but they also exacerbated cultural conflicts by concentrating the foreigners and limiting their normal economic and social contacts with Germans. Together with the decision to transfer asylum seekers to many small localities in eastern Germany, these policies set the stage for widespread cultural conflicts.

In a similar way the intense riots at Rostock grew out of cultural conflicts between several hundred asylum seekers, mainly Romas, and their German neighbors. The Rostock asylum hostel was badly overcrowded. Asylum seekers had to camp on the lawns outside the building, prompting their German neighbors to complain repeatedly about noise, dirt, begging, and gambling on the street.<sup>55</sup> Residents' complaints eventually led to an anonymous call in the local newspapers for a demonstration against asylum seekers. The riots began the next day when a crowd of 150 gathered outside the hostel.<sup>56</sup>

In Riesa cultural conflicts between Germans and foreigners were much more limited. Conflicts did occur over the theft of car radios later found in the asylum hostel, begging by gypsy children in the streets, and illegal trading by Vietnamese.<sup>57</sup> But in Riesa the conflicts between Germans and asylum seekers did not become matters of sustained public attention in which the skinheads could have intervened and found a sympathetic adult German audience. County officials housed the asylum seekers in former workers' barracks on the edge of Zeithain, a town of 4,500 people about five kilometers from the county's largest city; in contrast to Hoyerswerda, large numbers of German neighbors did not immediately adjoin the asylum seekers' building. Although Riesa county was also home to over 600 other foreigners, mainly laborers, the only conflicts between them and Germans were two small-scale attacks by skinheads against foreign businesses.<sup>58</sup>

**The Channeling and Mischanneling of Political Participation** Hoyerswerda and Riesa strongly support the channeling hypothesis. In Hoyerswerda at the time of the 1991 riots citizen participation mechanisms, such as public hearings, public dialogues between citizens and officials, and citizen attendance of city or county council meetings, were very limited. During all of 1991 Hoyerswerda residents were publicly invited to only four meetings.<sup>59</sup> In late August, however, city councilors hastily called a public forum to deal with conflicts surrounding the asylum seekers' hostel. This heated two hour meeting began to create nonviolent channels through which the asylum seekers' neighbors could participate. Officials made some concessions and promised another meeting with residents; moreover, they advised the neighbors on how to report legal violations such as excessive noise to the authorities. After unification these violations needed to be reported to the town clerk's office (*Ordnungsamt*) rather than to the police, as had been the practice under the Communist government. Before the August meeting most residents of Hoyerswerda did not understand the new process or the failure of the police to respond to their complaints.<sup>60</sup>

By contrast, there was no public meeting for the Germans who lived near the foreign workers, and those Germans did not learn about the procedure to make complaints about their non-German neighbors. These differences in political participation and political information can explain why the rioting was much more intense against the foreign workers in Hoyerswerda.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, the conflicts between the foreign workers and their German neighbors went back at least several years, compared with several months of conflicts between the asylum seekers and their neighbors.

While nonviolent channels were extremely limited or nonexistent, political participation was channeled into violence in Hoyerswerda during 1991. Skinheads learned that they could attack foreigners with near impunity; hence many adult German residents came to see the skinheads' methods as the most reliable ones for "doing something about the foreigners."<sup>62</sup> Moreover, skinheads gained visibility and a degree of legitimacy through vigilante activities that were tolerated by the police and greeted by the population. While crime was rapidly rising during winter 1990–91, a neo-Nazi group of about ten skinheads (*Neue Deutsche Ordnung*) was formed. The group patrolled Hoyerswerda streets, offered fearful women rides home late at night, took action against burglars and auto thieves, and sometimes handed their victims over to the police.<sup>63</sup>

Crucially, Hoyerswerda police did not seriously interfere with the assault against the foreign workers' housing on the first few nights of rioting in September. A force level of one hundred police officers was not reached until the third night of rioting; the foreign workers' housing was not cordoned off until the fourth day; and eyewitnesses reported that the police were passive and scared. Deliberate police passivity was even more evident in the Rostock riots, where police forces and equipment were

adequate in size yet police inaction during the first three nights of rioting was remarkable. Eventually police forces withdrew completely for two hours, allowing seventy youths to set on fire a building housing over one hundred foreign workers, all of whom miraculously escaped over the rooftops.<sup>64</sup>

The extreme failure of policing in Hoyerswerda was due in part to difficulties caused by the collapse of the Communist system and the unification process. As the old regime's secret police was disbanded, the regular local police forces proved to be inadequately trained and equipped to deal with crime in a society no longer controlled by the Communist Socialist Unity Party.<sup>65</sup> However, the police failure in Hoyerswerda was due also to the lack of a will to intervene decisively against skinheads and crowds of Germans on behalf of foreigners. While the lack of will was apparent at all levels, the Saxon interior minister, Rudolf Krause (CDU), played a key role by frequently downplaying right-wing violence and showing obvious uninterest in protecting foreigners. In Hoyerswerda he announced that he wanted to avoid a large police action and that asylum seekers should be fenced in or evacuated to an army building in a neighboring county.<sup>66</sup>

In Riesa, by contrast, cultural conflicts did not flare up dramatically in part because political participation was channeled into nonviolent forms. Violence against foreigners was repeatedly and speedily suppressed by the police, while channels for citizen participation in many areas were abundant. The skinheads therefore pursued other targets, and the other youth and adult citizens of Riesa did not act with pronounced open hostility toward the county's ethnic minorities.

Riesa's police acted decisively against right-wing youths almost every time they engaged in violence. In particular, police did not allow skinheads to employ vigilantism or to dominate the streets during any period. There were seven occasions during 1991 when police prevented rioting by large numbers of right-wing youths.<sup>67</sup> Police interfered especially with skinhead attacks against foreigners. For example, police turned up with a large force when the asylum hostel was approached by thirty to forty hostile youths in September 1992. Unable to act effectively against such a well-defended target, the skinheads tended to seek victims among leftists and punks in bars and discos, where the police were more reserved and the private owners or managers could not maintain order.<sup>68</sup>

Police acted more effectively in Riesa largely because their leaders were interested in combatting right-wing crime. Therefore, the officers learned how to deal with it much earlier, more quickly, and more thoroughly than the police in Hoyerswerda. Riesa's police experienced the institutional difficulties typical of eastern German police forces, and they confronted high and dramatically increasing general crime rates after unification. Hoyerswerda and Riesa counties had similar crime rates and similarly low rates at which crimes were solved.<sup>69</sup> But Riesa's police were successful in their priority areas, including the investigation of murders (seven out of seven

cases solved in one period) and the suppression of crimes by right-wing youth.<sup>70</sup> The successes of Riesa's police were partly due to the practical, persistent, and remarkably open-minded way they responded to their challenges. Police leaders in Riesa were open and communicative with the press, were willing to admit mistakes, and called on the public for cooperation.<sup>71</sup>

The nonviolent channels of participation in Riesa were as open as the violent ones were blocked. Citizens groups were quite active, and the number of nonviolent demonstrations, strikes, and petitions circulated was about three times as large as in Hoyerswerda.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, Riesa officials normally held hearings and discussions on a wide range of local public policy issues; in 1991 there were seventeen political meetings of all kinds in Riesa, four times the number held in Hoyerswerda, with topics such as "the problems of youth in our city" and noise from a disco. These kinds of citizen participation are an indicator of the overall relations between citizens and local authorities. It is likely that any neighbors of the Riesa county asylum hostel who were dissatisfied with the behavior of the hostel's residents would have felt comfortable approaching either the county employees managing the hostel, the police, or the elected officials of the town of Zeithain or Riesa county.

**National Political Opportunities** There is little evidence that the national debate on asylum rights accounts for the timing of the six major antiminority riots in eastern Germany in 1990–92. Most obviously, there is little correlation between the debate and the riots. The Hoyerswerda and Rostock riots, the most serious of these events, occurred during relative lulls in the asylum debate.<sup>73</sup> There are several other reasons to conclude that national political opportunities had little effect on the Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and other eastern German riots. First, the national asylum debate was relatively unimportant in eastern Germany. For example, the tabloid *Bild* (Dresden edition) failed to cover the debate at all during the two months prior to the Rostock riots, and the Rostock newspapers also carried few stories. Furthermore, eastern Germans consistently named economic problems as much more important than issues related to foreigners, also in the periods just before the riots. Only 8 percent of easterners named asylum as an important problem in September 1991 (compared with 45 percent of westerners), and the eastern figure rose to only about 20 percent in August 1992, compared with 60–80 percent who named unemployment.<sup>74</sup> Second, a brief riot by skinheads and youth against the foreign workers in Hoyerswerda in May 1990 occurred during a long lull in the national asylum debate.<sup>75</sup> Third, if the national debate on asylum were a major cause of the Hoyerswerda riots, the asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda would have been more important targets.

**Local Political Opportunities** By contrast, local political opportunities for antiforeigner mobilization increased just before the Hoyerswerda and Rostock riots. Local authorities in Hoyerswerda showed tacit support for antiimmigration positions

in three ways. First, county and city authorities were passive and inattentive toward the issue of foreigners, although not openly opposed to the minorities. The officials' passivity helped create a political vacuum on the issue, making it easier for the skinheads to assert an issue monopoly during the months leading to the riots.<sup>76</sup> Second, when local politicians and county administrators did address the issue at the citizens forum a month before the riots, they seemed to open opportunities for those who wanted to advance the agenda to expel foreigners. At that meeting acting mayor Klaus Naumann (SPD) told the angry crowd that he would talk with other officials about possibly moving the asylum seekers and would hold another meeting a month later.<sup>77</sup> He thereby opened the possibility of removing the asylum seekers from the neighborhood even as he was trying to channel residents' participation into negotiations and legal channels rather than violence. A similar pattern occurred in Rostock, where a city official, Peter Magdanz (SPD), tried to mediate between disgruntled residents and the wholly unresponsive city and state governments. Although he sought a nonviolent solution, Magdanz's calls to have the asylum hostel moved to another neighborhood probably increased expectations that the asylum seekers could be forced out violently.<sup>78</sup> Third, two widely reported police actions against foreigners by the Hoyerswerda police strengthened the antiforeigner agenda by creating the impression that someone in authority was finally willing to act against the foreigners.<sup>79</sup> In particular, in early July 1991 120 police from several counties conducted a highly publicized raid of Vietnamese cigarette dealers on the Hoyerswerda marketplace, arresting nineteen Vietnamese and one Turk. These arrests seem to have influenced the skinheads' choice of targets. Two months later the riots were touched off when eight skinheads attacked a group of Vietnamese traders on the street where they normally sold untaxed cigarettes.

By contrast, local opportunities for skinheads to influence in-migration by foreigners were quite small in Riesa, as official statements and actions were mainly educational and proforeigner. When asylum seekers arrived, Riesa's authorities initiated a small information campaign, designed to reduce prejudices and gain the natives' acceptance. During 1991–93 authorities held three meetings with German residents about asylum seekers (including a heated five hour discussion with soldiers at the Zeithain army base) and supported publication of several informative articles about asylum seekers in the local newspaper.<sup>80</sup>

**Social Movement Organizations: Skinhead and Neo-Nazi Groups** The organizational basis for antiminority violence was certainly present in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Riesa. A network of skinhead groups had become established in both East and West Germany during the late 1980s and had grown to about 6,500 participants, 3,000 of them in eastern Germany by 1991.<sup>81</sup> These groups, consisting mainly of working-class teenage boys and increasingly under the influence of neo-Nazi organizations in this period, emphasized group loyalty, hostility toward adult society,

and violence against relatively weak groups, especially foreigners and leftists. The network of skinhead groups in Hoyerswerda was stronger than in most places in Saxony. The instigators of violence included a hard core of about thirty youths who used neo-Nazi symbols and slogans and were prone to violence and another twenty sympathizers who were friends of hardcore members.<sup>82</sup> In Rostock, too, a large group of local skinheads and right-wing youths was involved in the riots. Moreover, on the second night of rioting, skinheads and neo-Nazis came to Rostock from other cities in Germany. They brought hardcore leadership and aggressive tactics, such as setting cars on fire to create barricades.<sup>83</sup>

Nonetheless, Riesa shows that organized and active perpetrators are not sufficient to produce antiminority riots or significant antiminority violence. Although Riesa skinheads formed a relatively large group and were at least as criminally active as their counterparts in Hoyerswerda (eleven skinhead crimes against all targets reported over a fifteen month period in Riesa compared with eight in Hoyerswerda), most of the Riesa skinheads' actions were attacks on leftist youth or on train and bus stations.<sup>84</sup>

### **Conclusions: Immigration, Democratization, and Antiminority Riots**

In the early 1990s eastern Germany underwent a transition to democracy, immigration, and a series of antforeigner riots. Analyzing this setting can provide insight into the processes that link both recent immigration and transitions away from authoritarian rule to antiminority riots. The evidence from eastern Germany points to local political processes, not ethnic competition or national opportunities, as the main causes of the riots. In-migration by ethnic minorities led to riots in those localities where cultural conflicts were heightened by specific housing practices, residents' participation was mischanneled, local opportunities for antiminority politics were provided, and social movement organizations mobilized support.

In eastern Germany the local processes that linked migration to riots were made much more likely by the rapid, chaotic transitions to both representative democracy and a market economy during German unification. These transitions created many major tasks and problems simultaneously, such as economic privatization and the reconstruction of public administration. Distracted by these matters, many state and local officials failed to respond effectively to the conflicts between Germans and foreign minorities by housing foreigners carefully, creating channels for nonviolent participation, and decisively policing the skinhead groups. However, as Riesa illustrates, many local and state officials in eastern Germany did respond effectively. The political failures also occurred at the subnational and not only the national level.<sup>85</sup>

Where attempts to extend democratic rights are accompanied by the collapse of state authority over an ethnically diverse population, antiminority riots often result.



For example, anti-Jewish pogroms in Odessa after the 1905 October Manifesto in Russia, anti-Muslim riots in India before independence, and assaults on Romas' houses after the fall of Communism in Romania fit this pattern.<sup>86</sup> The local political processes identified in the eastern German cases may be important links between democratization and riots in other cases, too, though not necessarily the only links. That is, if a transition to democracy occurs in the context of long suppressed cultural conflicts, then the sudden granting of civil liberties for antiminority groups, combined with delays in creating nonviolent channels and developing adequate police forces, may cause riots.

Even where representative democracy is established, migration and cultural conflicts often precede antiminority riots. For example, antiblack riots in northern U.S. cities before World War II, riots against West Indians and South Asians in Britain from the late 1940s to mid 1960s, and anti-Italian and anti-Turkish riots in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s all occurred relatively soon after significant numbers of the minority group had arrived. Moreover, in these three countries there is evidence that riots grew out of cultural conflicts between the long-time residents and the newcomers over such matters as the use of knives in fights, sexual jealousies, and prostitution. The practice of housing ethnic minorities in hostels made riots especially likely, since hostels concentrate the behaviors that the dominant group finds threatening and also make the minority group more vulnerable to large-scale attack.<sup>87</sup>

Are antiminority riots a transient phenomenon? Husbands argues that the importance of cultural conflicts explains why antiminority riots are often limited to the early, "immature" phase of ethnic relations and are then replaced in later phases by small-scale racist violence (undertaken by the dominant group) and commodity riots (by the subordinate group).<sup>88</sup> There are four main reasons why antiminority rioting tends to decline after the initial phase of majority-minority contact; all have operated to large though varying degrees in the industrialized democracies and can account for the apparent end of antiminority rioting there. First, the minority and majority groups gain experience with each other in residential areas and workplaces, so that cultural differences are hidden, ignored, or recognized as banal and no longer become fuel for fears and wild rumors. Second, political elites often react to riots by creating nonviolent channels for conflicts between dominant and minority ethnic groups and by preventing the creation of opportunities for antiminority groups. Similarly, police often become better prepared to prevent riots. Third, apparent opportunities for removing ethnic minorities become less available than when immigrants first arrived. In West European countries and in most U.S. cities the sheer size and long presence of minority populations have made demands for removing them less plausible than at the onset of migration. Growth in the minorities' social and civil rights also dampens their enemies' prospects. The fourth reason is paradoxical. In many countries far-right parties have become electorally successful by making

antiimmigrant appeals and eschewing violence, or else mainstream parties have become more willing to sound antiminority themes.<sup>89</sup> In either case, parties' mobilization against immigrants may help to channel antiminority sentiments into electoral politics and away from violence, even though at the same time it heightens those sentiments.<sup>90</sup>

Nonetheless, antiminority rioting does not necessarily cease in representative democracies, as the experience of contemporary India shows. The four processes just sketched are contingent on many other developments. Where migration of ethnic groups to new areas continues (even on a local or regional scale), where minorities remain socially unintegrated, where channels for nonviolent participation remain weak, where mainstream politicians choose openly to encourage violence, where nationalist parties promote violence instead of a purely electoral strategy, where international borders are in dispute, and where policing breaks down, antiminority riots will be more likely to occur.

## NOTES

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1. For ideological explanations, see Panikos Panayi, "Racial Violence in the New Germany, 1990–93," *Contemporary European History*, 3 (1994), 280–85; Gert Krell, Hans Nicklas, and Anne Ostermann, "Immigration, Asylum, and Anti-Foreigner Violence in Germany," *Journal of Peace Research*, 33 (1996), 153–70; Asgharali Engineer, *Communalism and Communal Violence in India* (Delhi: Ajanta, 1989), pp. 26–36. For explanations based on inequality and competition, see Wilhelm Heitmeyer, "Das Desintegrationstheorem," in Wilhelm Heitmeyer, ed., *Das Gewalt-Dilemma* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 45–46; Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Subho Basu, "Strikes and 'Communal' Riots in Calcutta in the 1890s," *Modern Asian Studies*, 32 (1998), 949–83. For political-entrepreneurial explanations, see Ruud Koopmans, "Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme-Right Violence in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research*, 30 (December 1996), 200–6; Stanley Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 224–30, 260–65.

2. For a similar argument, see Rogers Brubaker and David Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24 (1998), 423–58.

3. Antiminority riots include events where the subordinate group fights back to a greater or lesser degree but exclude those where only the subordinate group engages in sustained attacks. For more specifics on size, see note 7.

4. Frank Esser and Hans Brosius, "Television as Arsonist?," *European Journal of Communication*, 11 (1996), 235–60; Ruud Koopmans, "Asyl: Die Karriere eines politischen Konflikts," in Wolfgang van den Daele and Friedhelm Neidhardt, eds., *Kommunikation und Entscheidung* (Berlin: Sigma, 1996), 167–92.
5. Ashutosh Varshney, "Postmodernism, Civic Engagement, and Ethnic Conflict," *Comparative Politics*, 30 (October 1997), 2.
6. Author's estimate from Koopmans, "Explaining the Rise," p. 190; and Jens Alber, "Zur Erklärung fremdenfeindlicher Gewalt in Deutschland," in Ekkehard Mochmann and Uta Gerhardt, eds., *Gewalt in Deutschland* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 42–43.
7. Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, ed., *Neofaschistische Gewalt und Straftaten in der BRD, 1985–1995* (Bonn: Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, 1995). I define major riots as involving at least 500 participants, or at least one hundred on two consecutive days; they were identified from analyses of *die tageszeitung*, cd-rom edition (1986–1997). See Roger Karapin, "Major Anti-Minority Riots and National Legislative Campaigns against Immigrants in Britain and Germany," in Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham, eds., *Challenging the Politics of Ethnic Relations in Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 312–47.
8. Manfred Kuechler, "Germans and 'Others' ?," *German Politics*, 3 (April 1994), 64; Alber, pp. 70–74.
9. Helmut Willems et al., *Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1993), pp. 40–41, 44, 50–51.
10. For example, see Olzak, pp. 24–47; Albon Man, "Labor Competition and the New York Draft Riots of 1863," *Journal of Negro History*, 36 (October 1951); Surangan Das, *Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905–1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991).
11. Robert E. Park, *Race and Culture* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1950), pp. 236–39.
12. Christopher Husbands, "The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion," *European Journal of Political Research*, 16 (1988), 706; Christopher Husbands, "Racial Attacks," in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn, eds., *Traditions of Intolerance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), p. 96.
13. Allen Grimshaw, "Three Cases of Racial Violence in the United States," in Allen Grimshaw, ed., *Racial Violence in the United States* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 105.
14. Clark McPhail, *The Myth of the Madding Crowd* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991).
15. William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd ed. (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1990), 14–18.
16. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1978); Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
17. Tilly, p. 100.
18. For antiminority riots, see Morris Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence," in Hugh Graham and Ted Gurr, eds., *Violence in America* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 415–16; Allen Grimshaw, "Actions of Police and Military in American Race Riots," in Grimshaw, ed., pp. 269–87.
19. Ralph Turner, "Race Riots Past and Present," *Symbolic Interaction*, 17 (1994), 313; Neil Smelser, *The Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 236–40; Helmut Willems, "Gewalt gegen Fremde," in Hans Peter Nolting et al., *Aggression und Gewalt* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1993), p. 173.
20. Tilly, p. 133.
21. For example, Koopmans, "Explaining the Rise," pp. 202–4; Graeme Atkinson, "Germany," in Tore Björge and Rob Witte, eds., *Racist Violence in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 160–61; Karl-Otto Richter and Bernhard Schmidtbauer, "Zur Akzeptanz von Asylbewerbern in Rostock-Stadt," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 1993 (Nos. 2–3), 51–52; Willems, *Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt*, pp. 225–26.
22. See, for example, Varshney, p. 12; Paul Brass, "Introduction," in Paul Brass, ed., *Riots and Pogroms* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 12–13.
23. Rob Witte, *Racist Violence and the State* (New York: Longman, 1996), pp. 5–6; Roger Karapin,

"The Politics of Immigration Control in Britain and Germany," *Comparative Politics*, 31 (July 1999), 423–44.

24. In Germany police are under the authority of state governments and are often responsive to elected county and city representatives.

25. Turner, pp. 315–16.

26. John D. McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82 (1977), 1212–41.

27. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 53–65.

28. Willems, *Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt*, pp. 191–93; Klaus Farin and Eberhard Seidel-Pielen, *Skinheads* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1993).

29. Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957), p. 110; Robert Weinberg, "Anti-Jewish Violence and Revolution in Late Imperial Russia," in Brass, ed., *Riots and Pogroms*, p. 61; Edward Pilkington, *Beyond the Mother Country* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1988), pp. 101–2, 106–18.

30. Hence I will use the terms "foreigner" and "ethnic minority" as synonyms for "immigrants" when discussing German cases.

31. Data from Statistisches Bundesamt, Federal Ministry of the Interior, and *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden* (1992), p. 492.

32. Daniel Kanstroom, "Wer sind wir wieder? Laws of Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship in the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany," *Yale Journal of International Law*, 18 (Winter 1993), 155–211.

33. Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1992), p. 76; *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1993* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1994), pp. 79–80; author's calculations.

34. Karapin, "Major Anti-Minority Riots," p. 321.

35. Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991*, p. 76.

36. From my analysis of attacks during January–December 1991 and August–November 1992 reported in *die tageszeitung* and Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, ed., *Über den schonenden Umgang der Bundesregierung mit dem Rechtsextremismus, Teil 4* (Bonn: Partei des demokratischen Sozialismus, 1993).

37. Hoyerswerda: county population, 100,900; largest city, 62,400 residents; foreign population, 799 (January 1992), or 0.8 percent of total; 230 asylum seekers in 1991; official unemployment, 8.1 percent (September 1991); unofficial unemployment, including those on short hours, 23.4 percent (summer 1991). Riesa: county population, 89,000; largest city, 44,400; foreign population, 892 or 1.0 percent; 260 asylum seekers; official unemployment, 8.3 percent; unofficial unemployment, 23.0 percent (same dates as for Hoyerswerda). Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung, ed., *Laufende Raumbewertung: Aktuelle Daten zur Entwicklung der Städte, Kreise, und Gemeinden, 1992–93* (Bonn: Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung, 1995); foreign population data provided by Statistisches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen; unemployment rates are author's calculations from *Sächsische Zeitung*, Hoyerswerda edition, Aug. 8, Sept. 7, 1991; *Wochenblatt*, Oct. 11, 1991; *Sächsische Zeitung*, Riesa edition, July 9, Oct. 10, 1991; asylum seekers from *Sächsische Zeitung*.

38. Data from Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen; the Zentrale Ausländerbehörde in Saxony; Staatsministerium des Innern, Saxony, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1993* (Dresden: Staatsministerium des Innern, Saxony), p. 21; and a very helpful interview with Bernd Wagner, Berlin, August 14, 1997. Low violence communities were defined as those lacking reported attacks (see note 37) against foreigners' housing that involved attempted arson, storming or besieging of the building, injuries, or the flight or evacuation of the residents.

39. Paul Hockenos, *Free to Hate* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 24–25.

40. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Feb. 21, 1991; other data supplied by Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen. Resettlers were not housed in Hoyerswerda until 1993.
41. All accounts of the 1991 Hoyerswerda riots are from *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), *Lausitzer Rundschau*, Hoyerswerda edition; *Hoyerswerdaer Wochenblatt*; *Hoyerswerdaer Wochenspiegel*; *Bild*, Dresden edition; and the *Dresdner Morgenpost*, Sept. 19–27, 1991.
42. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 24, 1991.
43. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Sept. 14, 1992.
44. Irwin Collier, "German Economic Integration," in Michael Huelshoff, Andrei Markovits, and Simon Reich, eds., *From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 97; Thomas Baylis, "Transforming the East German Economy," in *ibid.*, pp. 83–89; author's calculation.
45. Similar to my findings, a county-level cross-sectional multivariate analysis showed no relation between unemployment and attacks on foreigners. See Alan Krueger and Jörn-Steffen Pischke, "A Statistical Analysis of Crime against Foreigners in Unified Germany," *Journal of Human Resources*, 32 (Winter 1997), 182–209.
46. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), Sept. 7–8, 1991; *Hoyerswerdaer Wochenblatt*, Aug. 16, Sept. 13, Oct. 11, Dec. 13, 1991; Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, ed., *Arbeitsstatistik 1992, Jahreszahlen* (Nürnberg: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1993), p. 263.
47. Rainer Joedecke, "Willkommen in Hoyerswerda," *Kursbuch Hoyerswerdaer Wochenblatt*, 107 (1992), 77.
48. Kanström, p. 197, n. 337; *Hoyerswerdaer Wochenblatt*, July 26, 1991.
49. Foreign population share also declined in the county; data supplied by Ordnungsamt der Stadt Hoyerswerda, July 1997 (author's calculations).
50. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Apr. 10, 1991.
51. Interviews with Martin Schmidt, Hoyerswerda, July 31, August 1, 1997; Joedecke, pp. 76–77; Hockenos, p. 24.
52. *Hoyerswerdaer Wochenblatt*, July 26, 1991; *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), July 19, Aug. 29, 1991; *Lausitzer Rundschau*, Aug. 29, 1991.
53. Patrick Ireland, "Socialism, Unification Policy, and the Rise of Racism in Eastern Germany," *International Migration Review*, 31 (Fall 1997), 548–49.
54. Ursula Münch, *Asylpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Entwicklung und Alternativen*, 2nd ed. (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1993); Ursula Linke and Klaus Ness, "Von der GST zur ZAST," in Ralf Ludwig, Klaus Ness, and Muzaffer Perik, eds., *Fluchtpunkt Deutschland* (Berlin: Schüren, 1992), pp. 124–36.
55. *Ostsee Zeitung*, June 18–19, 1992; *Norddeutsche Neuste Nachrichten*, Rostock edition, June 18, July 14, 1992.
56. *Norddeutsche Neuste Nachrichten*, Aug. 19, 1992; Stefanie Würtz, "Rostock Chronologie," unpublished manuscript, 1993.
57. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), July 26, Dec. 18, 1991, Feb. 8, 1992; *Bild*, Dec. 21, 1992.
58. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), May 28, 1993.
59. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), *passim*.
60. Interview with Schmidt; *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), Aug. 16, 29, 1991; *Lausitzer Rundschau*, Aug. 29, 1991.
61. *Hoyerswerdaer Wochenblatt*, Sept. 20, 1991; *Dresdner Morgenpost*, Sept. 20, 1991; *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda) Sept. 21, 23, 1991; *die tageszeitung*, Sept. 21, 1991; *Junge Welt*, Sept. 23, 1991.
62. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), Oct. 5, 1990, Aug. 29, Sept. 19, 1991. More than a dozen attacks against foreigners were reported in the week prior to the riots.
63. *Die tageszeitung*, Sept. 23, 1991.
64. *Die tageszeitung*, Aug. 26, 1992.

65. Willems, "Gewalt," p. 175.
66. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), June 8, 28, Sept. 18, 21, 23, 1991.
67. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Mar. 13, 18, 26, Apr. 13, May 8, Aug. 17, Nov. 9, 1991.
68. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Apr. 13, 1991, Aug. 29, Sept. 14, 1992.
69. Landeskriminalamt Sachsen, *Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik Freistaat Sachsen 1992* (Dresden: Landeskriminalamt Sachsen), p. 31; *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Jan. 28, 1993; data provided by Polizeidirektion Bautzen.
70. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Jan. 28, 1993.
71. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Mar. 13, 1991.
72. Eight in Riesa versus three in Hoyerswerda. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa and Hoyerswerda), *passim*.
73. Campaigns were measured by articles in *die tageszeitung*, which ranged from one to 104 per month during 1990–93, with five separate peaks of over twenty articles per month. I judged that a campaign existed prior to a riot if leading politicians were involved and at least twenty articles were published during the previous thirty days. By contrast, in the sixty days before Hoyerswerda only five articles per month were published, and in the sixty days before Rostock only eleven articles per month. For details and a graphic presentation, see Karapin, "Major Anti-Minority Riots," pp. 320, 330–37.
74. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen data (open-ended question) from Eike Hennig, "Deutschland von Rechts," *Wochenschau für politische Erziehung, Sozial- und Gemeinschaftskunde*, 42 (November-December 1991), 212; Dieter Roth, "Was bewegt die Wähler?," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (March 18, 1994), 6–7.
75. *Die tageszeitung*, May 7, 1990; the lull was indicated by a steady trickle of about two articles per month for the previous twelve months.
76. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), 1990–91, *passim*.; conversation with Helmut Willems, August 6, 1997, based on his field research.
77. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), Aug. 29, 1991.
78. *Ostsee Zeitung*, June 25, 1992.
79. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Hoyerswerda), July 6, 19, 1991.
80. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa), Jan. 23, Feb. 21, Mar. 7, 1991, Oct. 15, 1992, Feb. 13, 1993.
81. Bundesministerium des Innern, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1991*, p. 91.
82. Interviews with Schmidt, Wagner, and Friedhart Vogel, Hoyerswerda, July 29, 1997; sources cited in note 42.
83. Würtz.
84. *Sächsische Zeitung* (Riesa and Hoyerswerda), October 1991 through December 1992.
85. For a focus on national policy failures, see Ireland, pp. 550–62.
86. Weinberg; Ian Copland, "Communalism in Princely India," *Modern Asian Studies*, 22 (1988), 813; Laszlo Kürti, "Racism, the Extreme Right, and Anti-Gypsy Sentiments in East-Central Europe," in Jean-Yves Camus, *Extremism in Europe* (Paris: éditions de l'aube, 1998), p. 426.
87. Grimshaw, "Three Cases," pp. 106, 108, 110, 112; Allen Grimshaw, "Factors Contributing to Color Violence in the United States and Britain," in Grimshaw, ed., pp. 258, 263; James Wickenden, *Colour in Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Dilip Hiro, *Black British, White British*, rev. ed. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973); Pilkington, esp. pp. 49–51; Witte, pp. 116–18, 122–23.
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