Seminar: Archishman Chakraborty (Yeshiva University)

Archishman Chakraborty is the Mel Harris Chair in Insurance and Risk, and Chair of the Finance Department at the Syms School of Business, Yeshiva University. His research interests are in corporate finance, information economics, game theory, and market microstructure.

Presented Paper: Selected Facts
Author(s): Nemanja Antic¹ and Archishman Chakraborty²
This version: September, 2024.
Abstract: We consider constrained persuasion problems where a sender must provide facts to persuade a receiver to accept or reject a proposal. We show that the sender-optimal strategy of selecting facts corresponds to a maximum cardinality matching on a particular bipartite graph. We give exact conditions under which the sender induces his ideal decisions. Receiver payo§s are independent of the senderís cardinal preferences, even though these preferences determine the sender-optimal strategy. When the receiver can specify the set of admissible facts ex ante, we identify conditions under which the receiver would (not) like to eliminate the senderís freedom to select facts.
JEL Classification: C72, D71, D72, D82.
Keywords: persuasion, evidence, disclosure, matching.

¹ Kellogg School, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois; nemanja.antic@kellogg.northwestern.edu.
² Syms School, Yeshiva University, New York, New York; archishman@yu.edu.